Every time Yerevan has attempted to take a step toward the West, it has encountered even stronger pressure from Russia and, ultimately, ended up in an even tighter "embrace" ... — Armen Grigoryan

Every time Yerevan has attempted to take a step toward the West, it has encountered even stronger pressure from Russia, ultimately ending up in an even tighter "embrace" by Moscow. This was written by Armen Grigoryan, former Secretary of the Security Council.

"The other day, I noticed in the news that the Constitutional Council is discussing a proposal by the 'Republic' party to include a provision regarding Armenia’s EU membership in the draft Constitution. Meanwhile, in one of his interviews—without mentioning me by name, but clearly referring to my own interview—Aram Sargsyan expresses surprise at how a former high-ranking official could compare dependence on the European Union with dependence on Russia. My position on this matter is no secret to any of my former colleagues. And since the topic has already been broached, I thought it worth discussing in a bit more detail." At first glance, the idea of ​​joining the European Union seems attractive. Moreover, for many, it represents a natural continuation of Armenia’s civilizational choice. However, I believe that in this regard, we often confuse what is desirable with what is possible.

When assessing the prospect of Armenia’s EU membership, one must take into account a number of political, geographical, and economic factors that render this goal unrealistic. And this is where my primary concern lies: what will happen if Armenia continues to pursue a goal for which there is, in essence, no real possibility of realization? It is my firm conviction that every further step taken along this path does not diminish, but rather deepens, Armenia’s dependence on Russia.

Looking at Armenia’s recent history, a very clear and harsh pattern emerges: Every time Yerevan has attempted to take a step toward the West, it has encountered even stronger pressure from Russia, ultimately ending up in an even tighter "embrace" from Moscow.

In the 1990s, the efforts of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s administration to move closer to European and Euro-Atlantic structures culminated in membership in the CSTO and the signing of a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with Russia in 1997—thereby strengthening Armenia’s military-political ties with Moscow.

In the 2010s, the attempt by Serzh Sargsyan’s administration to sign an Association Agreement with the EU ended with the decision on September 3, 2013, to join the Customs Union, which was subsequently followed by Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union.

Today, this same history appears to be repeating itself—but within a far more dangerous scenario. Alongside the discussions and steps regarding EU membership, I see an increasing threat of Armenia being drawn into the Russian-Belarusian "Union State."I have personally seen how much freedom we had to reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia before the adoption of the law on EU membership, and how those opportunities have been limited since then. During the period when Russian border guards were withdrawing from 17 points along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border—as well as from the Zvartnots checkpoint and the checkpoints on the borders with Iran and Turkey—and while EU observers were being deployed along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border; when the EU was providing Armenia with a "peace instrument," when Armenia was initiating military-technical cooperation with EU member states, when the dialogue on EU visa liberalization began, when the Armenia-EU-US summit took place (resulting in €270 million in support for Armenia’s resilience programs), and when Armenia launched the "Eagle Partner" military exercises with the US and signed strategic partnership documents—throughout all of this, Armenia did not have a law regarding the process of EU accession. However, the absence of such a law did not prevent Armenia from taking concrete steps to reduce its dependence on Russia and deepen cooperation with other partners.

And what happened after the law regarding EU membership was adopted?

Russia’s political, cultural, and economic presence in Armenia became increasingly visible. The number of votes cast for pro-Russian political forces rose from 330,000 to 546,000; *Rossotrudnichestvo* initiated the opening of new "Russian Houses" in Armenia’s provinces; the Russian option is no longer ruled out for the construction of a new nuclear power plant; and Russia’s participation in the construction of the "Ajapnyak" station for the Yerevan Metro is already under discussion. A symbolic, yet highly telling, manifestation of all this is that the chairmanship of the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on European Integration has ended up in the hands of a pro-Russian political force. When the Armenian public discusses whether to build a school, a hospital, or a road in a given community, Russia has almost no opportunity to participate in that discussion. However, when the conversation turns to the question of EU membership, Russia is effectively invited to join the debate—and the consequences are clear.

This is no coincidence. Statements and actions regarding EU membership sharply exacerbate Armenian-Russian relations. Faced with a harsh and aggressive reaction from Russia, Armenia’s state "immune system" is simply unable to withstand Moscow’s economic, political, and hybrid pressures. Consequently, lacking genuine security guarantees from the West, Armenia not only fails to reduce its dependence on Russia but becomes even more vulnerable to its pressure," the statement reads.