"Zhoghovurd". Prisoner exchange in a "big deal"? Could the discussions turn into US-Azerbaijan-RA political trade?

The “Zhoghovurd” newspaper writes: “Can the “grand deal” being discussed in the US-Azerbaijan-Armenia format become the path by which the return of Armenian captives will be linked to the political agreements between Washington and Baku?”

Outlines of a possible US-Azerbaijan-Armenia “grand deal”

ArmLur.am has studied the latest developments in US-Azerbaijani relations, which are related to the extension of Resolution 907 of the United States of America’s “Freedom Support Act”, as well as the intensified discussions on possible new political agreements in the region.

On June 1, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev published on his social platforms a letter sent to him by former US President Donald Trump, which referred to the memorandum on the extension of the cancellation of the application of Resolution 907 of the aforementioned law. Aliyev noted that he was grateful to Donald Trump for the document, which was presented as a gift and accompanied by a personal signature and words of good wishes. According to the Azerbaijani president, he highly appreciates this step and considers it an important political and diplomatic gesture.

This publication actually shows that the US policy of temporarily lifting this restriction, which has been used for years as a tool for the normalization of US-Azerbaijani relations, continues.

New political maneuvers in Washington around Resolution 907

Resolution 907 was adopted in 1992 and was initially intended to limit certain types of state assistance to Azerbaijan, but since 2001, US presidents have periodically used their authority and temporarily suspended this restriction, allowing for continued cooperation with Baku.

Resolution 907 states that the US government cannot provide state assistance to the government of Azerbaijan until it takes certain steps related to relations with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and the lifting of the blockade.

The main meaning of the law is as follows:

The US Congress declares that direct state assistance to the government of Azerbaijan will not be provided, with the exception of certain humanitarian and non-governmental programs, until the US President certifies and reports to Congress that Azerbaijan:

§ has ceased all actions aimed at the blockade or restriction of Armenia

§ has taken concrete steps to eliminate the use or threat of force against Armenia and Artsakh

§ demonstrates progress in the peaceful settlement process

At the same time, the law provides that the president may temporarily waive these restrictions if this is necessary for the national security interests of the United States and if he informs Congress with appropriate justification. This is exactly the mechanism that Trump used.

The "Grand Deal" hypothesis and possible political bargainingAt the same time, discussions have intensified in international analytical circles about a possible new stage in US-Azerbaijani relations. The so-called “grand deal” version is being circulated, within the framework of which Washington could ease some restrictions on Baku, expecting in return the release of political prisoners and a number of detained Armenians. According to some assessments, this process may also be linked to the upcoming elections in Armenia.

The prestigious American research center, the Atlantic Council, published an article discussing the possibilities of such scenarios. The research center gave the following definition: “What better way is there to restrain Pashinyan’s pro-Russian opponents and preserve the path to peace than to release high-ranking Armenian prisoners before the elections?”

According to their definition, this group of prisoners should include anti-corruption advocate Gubad Ibadoglu, journalists from Radio Liberty and Voice of America, as well as some Armenian detainees. The impact of releasing unjustly detained people would be far more valuable to the United States than upholding a law that is ignored almost every year.

How to Build a Deal Sequence According to the Atlantic Council

The overall “grand deal” should be structured as follows: In the run-up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections in June, Azerbaijan should release some Armenians captured in Artsakh in 2023 as a goodwill gesture toward a possible deal. Washington and Baku should then work to reach an agreement to repeal Resolution 907 in exchange for the release of Azerbaijani detainees and additional Armenian prisoners.

For its part, the White House will work with Congress to secure that repeal before the scheduled releases, but only if Azerbaijan has renewed confidence in the seriousness of the deal.

There is a win-win situation for everyone in this proposed deal. Baku gets a “two-in-one” advantage: it retains a real partner for peace negotiations in Pashinyan, and solves its main problem with the United States. The Trump team gets the opportunity to release unjustly detained individuals and enhance the president’s peace-loving image at almost no cost. Republicans in Congress get a foreign policy victory for the president, while Democrats can emphasize their democracy in securing a human rights victory, and both mitigate the discontent of the Armenian diaspora, which is very active in the United States, by securing the release of the Artsakh elite and other Armenian captives. On the eve of the elections, Pashinyan increases his rating with voters.

The issue of captives at the center of geopolitical compromises

In this context, Aliyev’s publication of Trump’s letter can be viewed as a political signal about the intensification of relations with Washington and the preparation of a possible new round of negotiations. Moreover, this step may also be related to the transactional approaches being discussed at the international level, where political and humanitarian issues are interconnected with strategic interests.

In general, a situation is being created where US-Azerbaijani relations may enter a new phase, based on an interconnected agenda of reviewing legal restrictions, releasing political prisoners, and accelerating the regional peace process. Such developments can be viewed as an opportunity for a mutually beneficial deal, as a result of which a new political agreement may be formed, including the return of Armenian captives and political prisoners before the end of the electoral processes or on the eve of them.

Can the “grand deal” being discussed in the US-Azerbaijan-Armenia format become the mechanism through which the return of Armenian captives will become part of the political compromises between Washington and Baku? Is this process actually a humanitarian step or a component of broader geopolitical calculations? It is difficult to unequivocally assess the likelihood of this scenario being implemented, but the recent steps and public signals from the three states show that such discussions are no longer just at the theoretical level and can turn into a real political process.